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ARTICLES
CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS,
PRECOMMITMENT, AND FUNDAMENTAL
REFORM: THE CASE OF ARGENTINA
GEOFFREY P. MILLER7
I. INTRODUCTION
For millions of Argentines who straggled into the voting booths from
rain-drenched streets on May 14, 1989, the prospects for the future could
hardly have looked drearier. The outgoing President, Radical Party leader
Rafil Alfonsin, had guided the country toward a stable democracy. But,
despite enormous efforts, Alfonsin's economic policies proved disastrous.
Hyperinflation gripped the economy Argentina's enormous foreign debt
was in default.' Gross domestic product was decreasing and purchasing
power evaporating. The nation was falling into the Third World, even as
other Latin-American countries-Chile, for example-surged toward
prosperity. Fairly or not, Radical Party presidential candidate Edwardo
Angeloz bore the onus for the catastrophe.
Even so, the other major candidate, Rioja Province Governor Carlos Saul
Menem, offered little improvement. Menem's Peronist Party had been a
principal sponsor of Argentina's ruinous experiment with statist economic
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor, University of Chicago Law School. I would like to thank the
many Argentines who generously consented to be interviewed or otherwise assisted in this project,
including Julio Alsogaray, Ricardo Angl6s, Dr. Miguel A. Balestrini, Javier A. Bolzico, Juan J.
Bruchou, Omar C. Crillo, Maria Elena Deligiannis, Cesar A. Deymonnaz, Dr. Roberto Domenech, Dr.
Roberto Dominguez, Eduardo J. Fasulino, Roque Fernfndez, Javier Gonzrlez Fraga, Jos6 Maria Tbarbia,
Enrique J. Lonedn, Roque Maccarone, Dr. Jos6 Luis Machinea, Dr. Augusto C. Magliano, Facundo
G6mez Minujin, Raul Passano, Norberto Carlos Peruzzotti, Ignacio J. Carlos Premoli, Gonzalo Sfnchez
Sorondo, Osvaldo J. Ventura, and Alfiedo M. Vitolo. I would also like to thank Roberto Gangarella,
Dr. Augusto C. Magliano and Liliana Schumacher for their comments and Ricardo Maldonado for his
valuable research assistance.
1. See infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
2. See Menem Calls for "Major Surgery" to Economy, LATIN AM. REGIONAL REP.: S. CONE
(Latin Am. Newsl., Ltd.), Aug. 3, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Nwltrs File. By 1989,
Argentina's foreign debt exceeded 100 percent of GDP. INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN LATIN AMERICA, 1991 REPORT 24 (1992).
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policies His campaign platform was hardly reassuring: he promised a
"productive revolution" but endorsed inflationary wage increases.' His
ardent nationalism did not augur well for the future integration of Argentina
into the world economy.' Additionally, his party's prior opposition to
privatization did not suggest that fundamental reform would be forthcoming
in the state sector.
This was the first election in six decades in which one democratically
elected regime stood ready to relinquish power peacefully to another. But
doubt pervaded even here. Alfonsin had survived, but military revolts
threatened his grip.' The military could easily launch another coup. Many
Argentines believed that only strong and authoritative rule could return the
nation to a semblance of economic stability.9
Menem won this most inauspicious of elections with 48.9% of the vote
compared to 37% for Angeloz.' ° Then came the revolution.
Taking power five months early in the midst of complete economic
3. For an excellent discussion of the Peronist program during the 1940s and 1950s, see PAUL H.
LEwis, THE CRISIS OF ARGENTINE CAPITALISM 129-244 (1990).
4. See WILLIAM RATLIFF & ROGER FONTAINE, CHANGING COURSE: THE CAPITALIST
REVOLUTION IN ARGENTINA 34 (1990).
5. For a discussion of Menem's nationalism, see rgentina and Brazil Seek "Synergy," LATIN
AM. REGIONAL REP.: S. CONE (Latin Am. Newsl., Ltd.), Oct. 5, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Nwltrs File.
6. See Menem Calls for "Major Surgery" to Economy, supra note 2 (discussing Peronist
opposition to privatization proposals prior to 1989 election).
7. See Argentina Breaks with the Past, LATIN AM. REGIONAL REP.: S. CONE (Latin Am. Newsl.,
Ltd.) Dec. 21, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Nwltrs File; Alejandro Garro, Nine Years of
Transition to Democracy in Argentina: Partial Failure or Qualified Success?, 31 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1993). Since 1946, Argentina has been ruled by military juntas on three occasions:
1955-58, 1966-73, and 1976-83. See SUSAN CALVERT & PETER CALVERT, ARGENTINA: POLITICAL
CULTURE AND INSTABILITY xiii-xiv (1989). Even periods that were ostensibly democratic were often
marred by intimidation and fraud. See Edward C. Epstein, Democracy in 4rgentina, in THE NEW
ARGENTINE DEMOCRACY: THE SEARCH FOR A SUCCESSFUL FORMULA 3, 3 (Edward C. Epstein ed.,
1992); Alejandro Garro, supra.
8. Military insurrections occurred in April 1987, January 1988, December 1988, and December
1990. See Epstein, supra note 7, at 1.
9. For a discussion of the authoritarian strain in Argentine politics, see WILLIAM C. SMITH,
AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE CRISIS OF ARGENTINE POLITICAL ECONOMY (1989).
10. Recent Political Developments, Country Credit Risk Service, October 1, 1989, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ECOSVC file. The only other major voting bloc went to the conservative minor
party UCeD6, with 6.7%. See RATLIFF & FONTAINE, supra note 4, at 34. The Peronist Party thus
returned to power in Argentina for the first time since March 1976, when a military coup removed from
office General Per6n's third wife, the unfortunate Isabel. See Recent Political Developments, Country
Credit Risk Service, July 31, 1989, available in LEXIS, World Library, ECOSVC file.
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collapse, Menem privatized state industries," instituted important reforms
to the system of bank regulation," eliminated trade barriers, and restruc-
tured the tax system. He also negotiated a settlement of the nation's
external debt, controlled inflation by pegging the local currency to the U.S.
dollar, worked toward resolving the dispute with Great Britain over the
Malvinas (Falkland) Islands, and rehabilitated his country's reputation in
the world financial community.
These recent events in an important Latin American country raise
fundamental issues of political science and law which are of interest to the
analysis of any political system. In this Article, I will consider how
Argentina has addressed two universal problems: effecting fundamental
reform in the presence of powerful vested interests and precommitting to
restrain undesirable behavior by the government in the face of political
pressures for short-term solutions.
The problem of effecting fundamental reform in the presence of vested
special interests is central to the work of scholars such as Bruce
Ackerman, 3 Cass Sunstein,'4 and Mancur Olson. 5 In the case of
Argentina, the power of interest groups has been particularly troubling
because the political system has been so heavily dominated by organized
groups-industrial workers, large farmers, industrialists, domestic banks,
foreign banks, the military, the Catholic Church, and others. The
government's role has been reduced at times to that of a broker among
competing interest group claimants. Such a political system would not
appear conducive to fundamental reform. Yet, reform did occur, and it
occurred peacefully through the ballot box and through market changes
rather than through coup or insurrection.
Fundamental change was possible because Argentina experienced in
1989-91 the kind of constitutional moment that occurred in the United
11. See Sponsorship Statement-Commitment to Privatization, INSTIUTLMONAL INVESTOR, Oct 31,
1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTLNE file.
12. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Politics of Deposit Insurance Reform: the Case of Argentina, in
PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION (Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago ed., forthcoming 1993).
13. See, e.g., BRucE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); Bruce A. Ackerman,
Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs
Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) [hereinafter Ackerman, Storrs
Lectures].
14. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups and American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29
(1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987).
15. See, e.g., MANCuR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982).
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States during times such as the framing of the Constitution, the Recon-
struction Period, and the New Deal-a period in which ordinary, interest
group-dominated politics gives way to a different political environment in
which fundamental reforms are possible.'6
As with most constitutional moments, Argentina's grew out of a national
crisis. By 1989-91, Argentina had descended into a state of complete
collapse." Even for a country inured to instability, the crisis was
unparalleled. As a result, the public reached a remarkable consensus both
as to the causes of the fiasco and the necessary remedies. The causes were
an unstable political system vulnerable to seizures of power by authoritarian
regimes, a bloated state sector that had sapped the nation's economic
vitality for generations, and the inability of the political system to resist
powerful interest groups seeking state subsidies. The remedies were
democratic elections, reduction of the public sector, privatization of state-
owned industries, and creation of structures of government capable of
exercising fiscal and monetary restraint. There was surprisingly little
political opposition to the basic elements of Menem's program. In fact, the
opposition Radical Party has sometimes claimed that Menem is simply
implementing programs that they conceived. 8
A second basic question of political science and law-which is
fundamental to the work of scholars such as Jon Elster, 9 Stephen
Holmes, 20  Paul Kahn,21  and others-is that of strategies of
precommitment. How can a political system provide reliable assurances
that it will act in the public interest? Are there ways that a political system
can, like Ulysses, tie itself to the mast in order to navigate the seas of self-
government without answering the siren call of short term, self-interested
policies? 22 Argentina, simply because it has been unusually prone to short
term strategies adopted by politicians serving as temporary guardians of the
government, provides an excellent test case for this problem. The need to
16. As Bruce Ackerman has argued, a constitutional moment can occur even if the constitution
itself is not amended. See Ackerman, Storrs Lectures, supra note 13.
17. One perceptive Argentine observer refers to this period as a "break in history." Interview with
Dr. Augusto Magliano, (Dec. 1992) [hereinafter Magliano Interview].
18. See Bill Hinchberger, Argentina: Economy Minister Cavallo-Master ofReform, INSTITUTION-
AL. INVESTOR, May 30, 1992.
19. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SmENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1979).
20. Stephen Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 19 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1989).
21. Paul W. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98 YALE LJ.
449 (1989).
22. See ELSTER, supra note 19.
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adopt policies that could persuade the people of Argentina, Argentina's
international creditors, and the world at large that Argentina would resist
short-term pressures in the future is thus a compelling feature of Argenti-
na's ongoing search for political and economic stability.
In the United States, the problem of precommitment is typically seen as
one of constitutional law: matters deemed too fundamental to be subject to
the short-term play of public opinion or interest group politics are elevated
to constitutional norms-norms which can be altered or repealed only
through the extraordinary procedures of constitutional change. In
Argentina, however, constitutional reform was not a serious option.
Argentina's Constitution and Supreme Court have proven ineffectual at
preventing unconstitutional actions by past governments and were not equal
to the task of ensuring that the reforms of 1989-91 would be an enduring
part of the political system.
Argentina chose a different approach to precommitment. First, it
restricted its own behavior by legislation. Congress established the central
bank's independence while simultaneously denying it the power to bail out
bank depositors or lend to the government. Second, and equally important,
the government deliberately exposed itself to serious penalties from the
world financial market in the event that it failed to live up to its promises.
This strategy of exposing the national throat to the teeth of market forces
has provided a high degree of assurance that the government will in fact
keep its promises. Lacking reliable mechanisms for constitutional
precommitment, Argentina has elected to utilize the disciplines of statute
law and of the marketplace to keep its short-term impulses under control.
This Article is organized as follows. Part II provides background on
Argentina's general economic and political conditions. Part III offers some
thoughts about the mechanisms of fundamental change and precommitment.
II. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Few nations in modem times have been so mismanaged, or have failed
so spectacularly in achieving their potential, as the Republic of Argentina.
One of the richest nations in the world at the turn of the century,23
Argentina had descended fitfully, but seemingly inevitably, into ever greater
political and economic chaos. Its governments, whether military or civilian,
23. See Alan M. Taylor, External Dependence, Demographic Burdens, and Argentine Economic
Decline after the Belle tpoquey, 52 J. ECON. HIST. 907, 908 (1992). See generally DAVID G. ERRo,
RESOLVING THE ARGENTINE PARADOX: POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT, 1966-1992 (1993); LAURA
RANDALL, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ARGENTINA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1978).
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have promised much and delivered little; voiced concern for democracy
while ruling by decree; and claimed to be all things to all people while, in
the end, being precious little to precious few. The national culture of
twentieth-century Argentina finds its fullest expression in the Tango, a
combination of music, song and dance that evokes, through the plaintive
strains of the bandone6n, the broken hopes and faded elegance of a world-
weary Buenos Aires.
A. Conditions Through 1989
The roots of Argentina's decline extend far back into the nation's history,
but the immediate genesis lay in policies instituted by the Peronist Party
during the 1940s.24 Coming to power in 1946, Juan Per6n nationalized
(through purchase rather than expropriation) important industries and started
a process of government ownership of, or intervention in, major businesses.
This governmental intervention came to be almost a defining attribute of
the Argentine economic and political system. By 1990, the government
owned railroads, the telecommunications system, gas and electric utilities,
major banks, chemical factories, the leading petroleum manufacturer, most
iron and steel manufacturers, water and sewage companies, the post office,
large military industries, and more.' Many other industries which were
not state-owned received subsidies or trade protections from the govern-
ment. At the same time, industrial unions exercised considerable power to
obtain generous wage settlements from the government and the private
sector. The result was an industrial sector characterized by monopolistic
or oligopolistic production, distortions introduced by tax benefits and
subsidies, and insulation from international competition.26
Along with state involvement in the industrial sector came a political
system in which important interest groups acted as de facto partners with
government agencies in brokering particular strategies and policies.27
Government officials consulted major groups such as the military,
manufacturers, agribusiness, domestic and foreign banks, and organized
labor on a regular basis. These groups typically enjoyed a "virtually
24. For background on Per6n's philosophy and rise to power, see, e.g., GARY W. WYNIA,
ARGENTINA: ILLUSIONS AND REALITIES 37-69 (2d ed. 1992).
25. See, e.g., William C. Smith, Hyperinflation, Macroeconomic Instability, and Neoliberal
Restructuring in Democratic Argentina, in THE NEW ARGENTINE DEMOCRACY: THE SEARCH FOR A
SUCCESSFUL FORMULA 20, 48 (Edward C. Epstein, ed., 1992) [hereinafter Smith, Hyperinflation].
26. For good background on the statist model of Argentine development, see ER.RO, supra note
23; WORLD BANK, ARGENTINA: REFoRMs FOR PRICE STABILITY AND GROWTH 1-11 (1990).
27. See Epstein, supra note 7, at 13-19.
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monopolistic status as the quasi-official national representative for a
particular functional activity.' ' The role of the government, in turn, was
often to mediate among these competing interest groups.
This form of corporatist representation-de facto dominance of
governmental policies by major interest groups mediated by relatively weak
government agencies-led to a political system in which the government
disbursed subsidies to industry, wage increases to labor, and tariff
protections to both. The result, predictably, was ever-increasing inefficien-
cy in the nation's industrial sector9 and chronic, corrosive inflation.
When conditions became intolerable, government would announce
stabilization plans accompanied by austerity measures. However, political
or economic forces quickly undermined these efforts.3" The country was
unable to precommit reliably to undertake the necessary reforms, vibrating
instead, in the words of political scientist Jon Elster, in a cycle that
"begin[s] in austerity and end[s] in potlatch."3'
The inefficiencies of the Argentine corporatist state are reflected in its
economic output. As shown in Table 1, real gross domestic product (GDP)
growth rates have been anemic or negative through much of the 1980s.
Between 1981 and 1990, Argentina's GDP declined 1.9%, and its GDP per
capita declined by 3.2%.32
28. Id. at 14.
29. Because it exported on world markets, the agricultural sector operated under more competitive
principles.
30. Between 1984 and 1989, the government instituted five stabilization programs-all of which
failed. See WORLD BANK, supra note 26, at xi.
31. ELsTER, supra note 19, at 61.
32. INTER-AMERiCAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 2, at 273.
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TABLE 1: GROWTH (DECLINE) IN REAL GDP, 1980-89
Year Percent Change
1980 1.5%
1981 -6.6%
1982 -4.9%
1983 3.0%
1984 2.6%
1985 -4.3%
1986 5.6%
1987 2.2%
1988 -2.7%
1989 -4.6%
Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social Progress
in Latin America: 1990 Report (1990).
The enormous and inefficient public sector, coupled with the extraordi-
nary ingenuity of Argentine citizens at evading taxes, resulted in persistent
budget deficits. These deficits ranged from a high of 15% of GDP in 1982
(the year of the Malvinas War) to a low of 4.9% of GDP in 1986, a year
when Alfonsin's economic program enjoyed a short-lived success. These
deficits are shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2: BUDGET DEFICITS AS PERCENT OF GDP, 1980-1989
Year Deficit
1980 -7.1%
1981 -12.1%
1982 -15.0%
1983 -14.5%
1984 -11.6%
1985 -5.7%
1986 -4.9%
1987 -6.6%
1988 -9.0%
1989 -8.3%
Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social Progress
in Latin America: 1990 Report (1990).
The government employed two strategies to finance its deficits. First,
the central bank issued money to pay claims against the government. The
[VOL. 71:1061
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result was inflation.33 As shown in Table 3, during the 1980s, inflation
rates ranged from the disastrous (by U.S. standards) to the catastrophic.
TABLE 3: CONSUMER PRICES, 1980-1989
Year Average Annual Increase
1980 100.8%
1981 104.5%
1982 164.8%
1983 343.8%
1984 626.7%
1985 672.2%
1986 90.1%
1987 131.3%
1988 343.0%
1989 3,079.2%
Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social Progress
in Latin America: 1990 Report (1990).
Second, the government borrowed heavily on international debt markets.
As shown in Table 4, Argentina's external debt more than doubled during
the 1980s.
TABLE 4: ARGENTINA'S EXTERNAL DEBT, 1980-1989
Year Disbursed Debt (Millions $US)
1980 27,157
1981 35,657
1982 43,634
1983 45,919
1984 48,857
1985 50,947
1986 52,374
1987 58,423
1988 58,936
1989 63,314
Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social Progress
in Latin America: 1990 Report (1990).
33. See generally ENRIQUE GARCA VASQUEZ, LA ARGENTINA: CuARENTA MiOS DE INFLACION
(1988).
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B. The Crisis of 1989-91
Even if the overall picture during the 1980s suggested an economy
stumbling toward disaster, the catastrophe of 1989-1991 exceeded the most
pessimistic expectations.
In April 1988, the government, desperately short of foreign exchange,
suspended interest payments on its foreign bank debt.34 Meanwhile,
inflation, under some control since 1986, surged alarmingly. In July 1988,
consumer prices rose a frightening 26.6%, and rates continued high in the
following months.35
The crisis accelerated as the nation moved toward the May 1989
elections. Alfonsin gambled that by maintaining a strong domestic
currency against the dollar, he could stanch inflation and improve consumer
confidence.36 This policy required high interest rates on australs (the
Argentine currency) and a willingness by the central bank to use its limited
foreign reserves to support the exchange rate. Successful for a time, the
policy was extremely perilous because investors would keep their money
in australs only as long as they believed that the government would
maintain the exchange rate. Everyone knew that a devaluation would come
eventually.
In late January and early February 1989, the anticipated run occurred in
speculative frenzy dubbed the "golpe de mercado" (coup of the market).37
The central bank ran out of foreign exchange and abandoned its support for
the austral. Its economic policy in ruins, the Alfonsin government ceased
to exercise any vestige of monetary restraint; inflation exploded, with
wholesale prices rising an astonishing 104.5% in the single month of May
1989.38
The market's coup was as effective as any with guns and tanks, leading
inevitably to the Radical Party's defeat. Menem captured the presidency
and Peronists and their allies gained majorities in both houses of Congress.
By May 29, 1989, two weeks after the election, Argentines rioted and
looted supermarkets in a spate of violence that left fifteen dead and
34. See Smith, Hyperinflation, supra note 25, at 36.
35. See id. at 38.
36. See id. at 37-38.
37. See id. at 39-41.
38. See id. at 40.
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hundreds injured. This violence forced Alfonsin to declare a state of
siege. 9 Argentina became virtually stateless. Banks and money exchang-
es were closed. No one knew the value of their currency, other than the
fact that whatever value it had was disappearing fast. Consumer prices
rocketed to amazing heights, increasing to 114.5% in June 1989 and
196.6% in July 1989.40
So disastrous had the situation become that Alfonsin begged to leave
office early. Menem donned the presidential sash in July 1989, five
months before the scheduled transfer of power.41
It soon became evident that Menem, Peronist though he was, intended
nothing less than a revolutionary transformation of the Argentine econo-
my. 42 In 1989, his government announced plans for a program as radical
in its scope and ambition as any in the world, even in that extraordinary
year: privatization of state-owned industries;43 control of industrial
unions;' liberalization of trade barriers; overhaul of the tax system; and
elimination of virtually all government subsidies and benefits for private
industry.45
Elite economic advisors, many trained at American universities, flooded
into government offices and fomented plans to undo decades of statist
policies. They were carrying forward a revolution that began in Chicago
and Cambridge as much as it did in Buenos Aires and C6rdoba. Support-
ing these reforms was an important report by the World Bank entitled
Argentina: Reforms for Price Stability and Growth." Compiled by a team
of experts who were in Argentina during the market coup, the report
advocated comprehensive reform of monetary policy and public sector
39. See Recent Political Developments, Country Credit Risk Service, July 31, 1989, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ECOSVC file; Argentina Breaks with the Past, supra note 7.
40. See Smith, Hyperinflation, supra note 25, at 40.
41. See Argentina Breaks with the Past, supra note 7.
42. For a preliminary assessment, see WYNIA, supra note 24, at 194-221.
43. Congress authorized the privatization program in the Reform of the State Law of August 1989.
See 1DB Bullish on Argentine Outlook, LATIN AM. REGIONAL REP.: S. CONE (Latin Am. Newsl., Ltd.)
Nov. 22, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Nwltrs File.
44. Some powerful labor unions resisted Menem's programs, but one faction of the Confederacion
General del Trabajo (CGT), the nation's umbrella congress of labor organizations, voted for pro-Menem
leadership in November, 1989. See Leadership Battle Splits the CGT, LATIN AM. REGIONAL REP.: S.
CONE (Latin Am. Newsl., Ltd.) Nov. 16, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Nwltrs File.
45. See generally Pablo Rojo, Deregulation of the Argentine Economy, FUNDACI6N MEDrTERRA-
NEA NEWSL. (Banco de la Nacion Argentina), Sept. 1992, at 3.
46. WORLD BANK, supra note 26.
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activities.47
Before the Menem government's free-market policies could take effect,
however, the government had to survive the immediate crisis. Hyperinfla-
tion struck again in October 1989. The banking system collapsed, forcing
the government to declare a bank holiday in late December 1989 and early
January 1990.4" For a time, there was no functioning banking system and
no effective national currency.49 Banks were reduced to the role of acting
as exchange agents for foreign currency."t
Menem's economic team responded by substituting long-term govern-
ment bonds for deposits. Accordingly, when the banks reopened, there was
little for depositors to withdraw.5 The government also slashed govern-
ment spending and accelerated plans to privatize state-owned industries.52
Privatization was extraordinarily sweeping, with sales of the telephone
company (notorious as one of the worst in the world),53 the national
airline, television networks, electric companies, the national railway, and
even 10,000 kilometers of state-owned highway.54
The short-term result was recession without a significant reduction in
inflation, which was a devastating 2,314% for consumer prices in 1990."5
Menem's popularity suffered accordingly, dropping from a high of 80% in
September 1989 to a low of 21% in March 1991.56
In January 1991, Menem appointed as Minister of the Economy
Domingo Cavallo, a Harvard-trained economics Ph.D. with a penchant for
free-market policies.57 Cavallo, in turn, pushed for, and obtained, the
appointment of Roque Fernndez, a dynamic University of Chicago Ph.D.
47. See id. The macroeconomic study mission visited Argentina from January 31 through
February 14, 1989. The study was presented to the Menem Administration in July 1989. Id. at iii.
48. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
49. Magliano Interview, supra note 17.
50. Id.
51. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
52. See Smith, Hyperinflation, supra note 25, at 46-50.
53. See RATLIFF & FONTAINE, supra note 4, at 38.
54. See Sponsorship Statement, supra note 11.
55. See INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 2, at 29.
56. See Edward C. Epstein, Conclusion: The New Argentine Democracy: The Search for a
SuccessfulFormula, in THE NEw ARGENTINE DEMOCRACY: THE SEARCH FOR A SUCCESSFUL FORMULA
244, 253 (Edward C. Epstein, ed., 1992).
57. See Hinchberger, supra note 18; Norman Peagam, Argentina: Finance Minister of the Year-A
Dramatic Difference, EUROMONEY, Sept. 21, 1992; Argentina's Economy: Nearly Time to Tango,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 18-24, 1992, at 17. Cavallo had previously served as Foreign Minister. See Peagam,
supra.
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with similar free-market views, as president of the central bank. 8
C. The Recovery: 1991-93
Cavallo's master stroke, implemented in April 1991, was the convertib-
ility program, which required that australs be backed by government
holdings of gold or foreign reserves and stipulated that the central bank
would stand ready to convert australs into dollars (and vice versa) at a rate
of 10,000:1. 59
This program adopted the approach recommended by the World Bank in
Reforms for Price Stability and Growth:
the Government . . . [should] maintain a fixed exchange rate against the
dollar or a basket of currencies. This would provide the nominal anchor
necessary to operate a successful stabilization after hyperinfiation .... [A]n
important element for success is the availability of foreign resources to
provide reserves to back the new exchange regime.6
Such a program, the World Bank observed, would "guarantee that as
remonetization proceeds virtually the entire money supply will be backed
by foreign reserves."'"
The following year, the government obtained legislation further
implementing these reforms by explicitly guaranteeing the independence of
the central bank.62  The law grants central bank board members six-year
terms, provides that they cannot be removed except for poor performance,
and states that "in the creation and execution of monetary and financial
policy, the central bank will not be subject to orders or instructions from
the National Executive Power [i.e., the President]."'63 The law also
prohibits the central bank from granting loans to the national government,
58. See Hinchberger, supra note 18; Peagam, supra note 57.
59. To say that the reform "dollarized" the economy, however, is somewhat misleading because
the domestic currency had lost almost all credibility and the economy had effectively been dollarized
by the private sector due to the financial crisis of 1989-91.
60. WoRLD BANK, supra note 26, at xviii.
61. Id. at 28.
62. Ley 24,144, Carta Orginica del Banco Central de la Repfblica Argentina. Like the
convertibility program, the new central bank law closely tracks the recommendations of the World
Bank, which advised that Argentina should adopt legislation to:
make the Central Bank directors politically independent, in the sense that, once appointed by
the president and confirmed by the Congress, they might be removed only for closely defined
impeachable offenses. Their terms ought to be relatively lengthy, and staggered. They would
have full power to deny loan requests to any private or public agency.
WORLD BANK, supra note 26, at 62.
63. Ley 24,144, Carta Orginica del Banco Central de ]a Repfiblica Argentina, Articulos 3, 7, 9
(author's translation).
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provinces or municipalities, except on security of government bonds at
market prices. 64 It bars the central bank from granting any special
guarantees which "directly or indirectly, implicitly or explicitly, cover
obligations of financial entities, including depository institutions." 65
Further, the law prohibits the central bank from providing temporary
liquidity assistance to financial institutions for periods of more than thirty
days or for an amount greater than the institution's capital. The law also
requires that any such temporary liquidity assistance be backed by adequate
security.
66
The law of convertibility and related reforms appears to have sparked an
astonishing economic turnaround. Argentina's stock market quadrupled in
1991.67 Inflation fell precipitously and has remained low since; the
inflation rate for 1992 was a mere 17.5%.68 The economy has boomed,
with GDP growing 9% in 1992.69 Argentines who had socked away $50
billion or more overseas in order to avoid the chaos at home began to
repatriate their funds.7" Argentina's country risk premium-measured by
the spread between the yields on dollar-denominated Argentine bonds and
LIBOR-fell from 31.9% in the first quarter of 1990 to 8.4% in the fourth
quarter of 1992."' International agencies showered the nation with credits
and investment bankers flocked to Buenos Aires to solicit deals.72
Cavallo was widely hailed as a hero and became in the process more
popular than his boss, Menem-an astonishing feat for an Argentine
finance minister.7'
Argentina currently continues on the path toward free markets and
economic prosperity. But there are potential problems ahead. The law of
64. Ley 24,144, Carta Orgonica del Banco Central de la Repfilica Argentina, Artfculo 19(a),
65. Ley 24,144, Carta Orgfinica del Banco Central de la Repfiblica Argentina, Artfculo 19(k)
(author's translation).
66. Ley 24,144, Carta Orgdnica del Banco Central de la Repiblica Argentina, Artfculos 17(b-c),
19(d).
67. During 1991, the Argentine stock market was the world's top performer, returning more than
400% to dollar-based investors. See Argentina: Capital Markets Steam Ahead, EUROMONEY, Feb. 14,
1992 (Supp.).
68. Nathanial C. Nash, A New Rush into Latin America, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1993, § 3, at 6.
See Economic Indicators, FuNDACi6N MEDrmRRANEA NEWSL. (Banco de la Nacion Argentina), Sept.
1992, at 4.
69. Nash, supra note 68.
70. See Paul Hannon, Argentina: A New Spirit of Confidence, EUROWEEK, Sept. 5, 1992.
71. FuNDAC[6N MEDnrrRRANA NEWSL., March 1993, at 2.
72. See Hannon, supra note 70.
73. See Hinchberger, supra note 18.
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convertibility, depending as it does on a pegged exchange rate with the
dollar, does not appear viable in the long run. The law's strength is also
its weakness; it is vulnerable to a run to the dollar in the event that
economic agents lose confidence in the central bank's ability-or
willingness-to support the peso (which replaced the hyperinflated australs)
by exchanging dollars for pesos at the pegged one-to-one rate. Whether the
central bank will be able to support the peso if Argentina suffers continuing
balance of trade deficits is not clear.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Argentina ' Constitutional Moment
The reform in Argentina was possible because of the extraordinary
political circumstances under which it was adopted. These circumstances
amounted to what Bruce Ackerman has termed a "constitutional mo-
ment"74 -a time in which the ordinary politics of interest group rivalry
give way, temporarily at least, to a national consensus in favor of
fundamental reform. Following Ackerman, I use the term "constitutional
moment" without implying that any change occurred in the written
constitution-in the case of Argentina between 1989-91, none did.75 But
the events of those years were so profound and wrenching for the people
of Argentina, and the changes introduced by the Menem administration so
deep-seated, that the reforms were constitutional in a functional sense;
Argentine politics have been fundamentally altered, and the basic role of
government profoundly revised, as a result of the events of 1989-91.
This recent constitutional moment was arguably the third such event in
the history of twentieth-century Argentina. Earlier fundamental change
occurred in 1930, when the military displaced the democratically elected
President, Hip6lito Yrigoyen and replaced the previous policies of free-
trade and open markets with high tariff barriers and state sponsorship of
domestic industry. 6 The 1930 coup represented a shift away from the
path of development that Argentina had followed theretofore, which was
generally in line with that of liberal democracies such as Canada, in favor
74. See Ackerman, Storrs Lectures, supra note 13.
75. Similarly, Ackerman argues that the New Deal period constituted a constitutional moment for
the United States, even though no formal amendments were added to the U.S. Constitution during this
period. See id.
76. See generally LuGI MANZETI, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND ECONOMIC
STABmzATIoN: THE ARGENTINE CASE 26 (1991).
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of antidemocratic, authoritarian rule with pervasive state involvement in
markets.
The other constitutional moment of recent history, prior to the events of
1989-91, was the rise of Juan Per6n in 1945-46. Per6n's policies created
an Argentine corporatist state in which the government attempted to control
the economic system through nationalization of major industries and
through partnership with politically-favored, state-sponsored interest groups
enjoying a monopoly of political power in their fields of endeavor." The
distinctive feature of the Peronist constitutional moment was the institution-
alization of powerful interest groups, especially organized labor, as rent-
seeking organizations with the status of de facto participants in the process
of government.
Argentina's constitutional moment of 1989-91 represents a rejection of
each of its two prior moments of this century-the state economic control
and authoritarian government established in 19307s and the corporatist
state created by Per6n in 1946-and a return, in a sense, to the system of
democracy, open markets, and private ownership that had characterized
Argentina during its days of spectacular economic success between 1864
and 1930.7
9
How did the constitutional moment of 1989-91 come to pass? As
already noted, the events of the preceding years had been wrenching nearly
beyond measure. Argentina had experienced guerrilla warfare from the left,
followed by authoritarian military rule and a campaign of repression that
left thousands dead or "disappeared." The military junta, in a comic-opera
effort to restore national prestige, had precipitated a war with Great Britain
by invading the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands, a virtually unpopulated and
economically insignificant territory whose control had been in dispute for
more than a hundred years.80 Argentine forces suffered a humiliating
drubbing; the defeat discredited the military both as a fighting force and as
a capable government. The sense of national pride for which Argentines
are famous throughout Latin America suffered grievous damage.
On top of these political and military failures came the economic
instability of those years which culminated in the hyperinflation of 1989-
77. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
78. In fairness, Raul Alfonsin deserves much of the credit for dismantling the commitment to
authoritarian rule which existed to one degree or another between 1930 and Alfonsin's presidency.
79. See MANZETIt, supra note 76, at 25-28.
80. For a muckraking account, see JIMMY BumNs, THE LAND THAT LOST ITS HEROES: THE
FALKLANDS, THE PoST WAR AND ALFONSIN (1987).
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91. Hyperinflation demonstrated the failures of the Argentine economic
system to all who lived through those times." It eroded morale and tore
the social fabric. 2 Every petty detail of life was affected: merchants
could not put price tags on goods; customers could not comparison shop;
vending machines could not function; store credit was difficult to obtain
and mortgages out of the question; and prices of everyday goods and
services had to be reset or renegotiated on a weekly or even daily basis.
Across-the-board price increases were announced over supermarket public
address systems while shoppers were in the stores. Everyone sought ways
to unload their domestic currency, either by fleeing to goods-leading to
excessive purchases and hoarding--or by acquiring and holding scarce
foreign currencies, especially U.S. dollars. The costs of the special-interest
subsidies and protections that had been such a hallmark of Argentine
politics came home to ordinary citizens in the form of devastating losses
and anxieties.
By 1989, the concatenation of these difficulties readied the Argentines
for fundamental change. The constitutional moment which began in that
year had two parts: one political and one economic.
The political change was symbolized by the passage of authority from
Alfonsin to Menem. For the first time in sixty years, Argentina's
democratic institutions had withstood the ultimate test-the peaceful
transfer of power from one democratically elected leader to another
democratically elected leader of a different political party. Alfonsin had
worked during his presidency to re-establish a rule of law in Argentina
after the period of military rule. Alfonsin's willingness to cede power to
a rival epitomized the contribution which he and his government made to
Argentine political traditions-ironically, cementing his place in Argentine
history at a moment of political failure.
The events of 1989 arguably demonstrate a commitment on the part of
the Argentine system to democratic institutions and a repudiation of the
authoritarian style which had become synonymous with Argentine political
culture after the military coup of 1930. The growth of truly democratic
institutions is still fragile, however, and it may be premature to confidently
label the new dispensation a constitutional moment. Nevertheless, the
movement toward liberal democracy and away from authoritarian rule
81. The following description is based on interviews with Argentines who experienced the
hyperinflation period.
82. For a firsthand account of some of the problems of coping with the Argentine hyperinflation,
see WYNtA, supra note 24, at 3-15.
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appears sufficiently well-established to justify that description, at least
provisionally.
The other half of Argentina's constitutional moment of 1989-91 was the
dramatic movement toward free markets and the repudiation of the
corporatist economic policies most closely identified with Per6n. If credit
for reforming the authoritarian strain in Argentine politics goes to Alfonsin,
credit for dismantling the corporatist state must go to Menem. Alfonsin
and Menem have in effect jointly participated in the creation of a capitalist,
liberal democracy.
Although Menem did not spell out his economic programs during his
presidential campaign, and, therefore, his election was not itself a popular
mandate for economic liberalization, a remarkable popular consensus
appears to have developed after the fact in favor of his experiment in
radical deregulation and privatization. This is not to say that all the
reforms were popular--certainly, much of the labor movement opposed the
privatizations and others experienced losses as a result of the wrenching
shift to market-based policies. 3 Menem's popularity sank when his
reforms did not generate immediate results.84 However, no program as
radical as that instituted by Menem would be popular in all circles. The
essence of the matter is that the country acquiesced in the radical changes,
and that it is unlikely in the future to revert to the old style of politics
unless some other equally devastating political and economic crisis strikes.
B. Strategies for Precommitment
The events of 1989-91 will qualify as a true constitutional moment in
Argentine history if the changes identified with those years persist over a
substantial period of time. However, the survival of these changes will be
challenged by short-term pressures. Politically, the military or other groups
may attempt to subvert the democratic process if they believe that their
interests are better served by a return to authoritarian rule. Economically,
the still-powerful interest groups which benefitted from the corporatist state
may seek to undermine the process of financial liberalization and reinstate
some of the old system of state ownership, subsidy, and control. These
forces are likely to emerge more powerfully over time as the devastation
of hyperinfiation fades from popular memory, and as the recent surge in
prosperity gives way, as it inevitably will, to a less favorable economic
83. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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climate. How can the Argentine system precommit itself to maintaining
these reforms and to continuing its progress toward liberal democracy in
the future?
1. The Inadequacy of Constitutional Reform
One possibility for precommitment, which would probably be first in the
minds of United States citizens, is to use the Constitution in order to put
certain choices outside the reach of short-term political pressures.
Argentina, for example, could have adopted a balanced budget amendment
that prohibited the government from spending more than it collected in
revenues; or it could have constitutionalized the requirement that the central
bank not issue more domestic money than its holdings of foreign reserves.
Constitutional reform, however, would not have been effective in
Argentina.
From a political point of view, the Argentine Constitution-modeled
closely on the U.S. Constitution 8 -- already ostensibly precommits the
nation to democratic institutions and values. The President, chosen for a
six-year term by a democratically elected electoral college, acts as head of
state and commander-in-chief.86 The President cannot serve two consecu-
tive terms.87
The bicameral Congress consists of a Chamber of Deputies with
members standing for election every four years, with half elected every two
years, and a Senate with members chosen by provincial legislatures for a
period of six years, with a third of that body standing for election every
two years."8 The Congress has power to enact legislation, subject to
executive veto and congressional override.8 9
Members of the Judiciary are appointed by the President with the
approval of the Congress. 9 Justices of the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts hold office during good behavior and enjoy salary protect-
ions.91 The Supreme Court and the lower courts have jurisdiction over all
85. See RATLIFF & FONTAINE, supra note 4, at 6.
86. CON ST. ARG. arts. 81-84, 77, 86 in CONSTrrUTIONS OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein &
Gilbert H. Flanz eds., 2d ed. 1993).
87. CONST. ARG. art. 77, supra note 86. Menem forces have been speaking of amending the
Constitution to allow the President to serve a second term when his current term expires in 1995. See
Hannon, supra note 70.
88. See CONST. ARG. arts. 36-66, supra note 86.
89. CONST. ARG., supra note 86, at arts. 67-73.
90. CONST. ARG., supra note 86, at art. 86, item 5.
91. CONST. ARG., supra note 86, at art. 96.
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cases dealing with matters governed by the Constitution and the laws of the
nation.92
These constitutional provisions are remarkably similar to the analogous
provisions in the United States Constitution. However, the Argentine
Constitution has not guaranteed democratic rule. The Constitution itself
contains a state of siege provision authorizing the President to suspend
constitutional guarantees in case of internal disorder or foreign attack
endangering the operation of the Constitution.93 Beyond this, military
governments have governed the country by decree, in violation of
constitutional requirements.94 Whereas the United States Supreme Court
has arguably been an important mechanism for precommitment to
constitutional rule,95 the same cannot be said for Argentina's Supreme
Court, which has never effectively restrained unconstitutional political
action.96
It would appear desirable for the continuation of Argentina's progress
toward liberal democracy if the judiciary could be established as a central
institution of constitutional government with genuine powers of judicial
review. To date, that reform has not occurred. The Menem government
has not worked assiduously toward establishing the autonomy or indepen-
dence of the judiciary. Menem's administration has reportedly favored
court-packing legislation and initiated impeachment proceedings against the
Vice President of the Court, Augusto Belluscio, a political opponent.97
Opponents of the current government claim that judicial appointments have
been made for political reasons, that prosecutors have been removed when
they began to call attention to governmental corruption, and that judges
who objected to the government's programs have been denied jurisdiction
92. CONST. ARG., supra note 86, at art. 100.
93. CONST. ARG., supra note 86, at art. 23.
94. See, e.g., Boletin Oficial of the Republic of Argentina, November 21, 1978, in CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gilbert H. Flanz eds, 1st ed. 1978).
95. See, eg., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (ordering President Nixon to turn over
tapes of White House conversations during Watergate affair).
96. The Argentine Supreme Court has been subject to repeated purges and political manipulation,
especially during periods of miliary rule. See LEWiS, supra note 3, at 252-57. Lewis quotes a decision
made by the court during the military government in 1968, to the effect that .'ever since its
establishment, this Court has recognized the ability of a government which is the result of a successful
revolution... to do those things which are necessary for the accomplishment of its goals."' LEWIS,
supra note 3, at 255.
97. See Justice Minister Resigns Over Row, LATIN AM. REGIONAL REP.: S. CONE (Latin Am.
Newsl., Ltd.) Oct. 19, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Nwltrs File.
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over important cases. 98
An independent judiciary with popular support and genuine powers of
judicial review would provide valuable protection against reversion to
authoritarian rule. It may be that a subsequent phase of Argentina's
movement toward liberal democracy will involve the establishment of such
a judiciary. This development would potentially be advantageous as a
means of precommitting the political system to constitutional procedures
and the rule of law generally. As yet, however, the Constitution and the
judiciary, as guardians of the Constitution, do not provide realistic support
for bona fide precommitment.
In the absence of judicial review, Argentina's commitment to constitu-
tional rule can only be guaranteed by continued popular support for
democratic processes. At present, such processes appear to enjoy wide-
spread support. Nevertheless, the question whether a return to authoritari-
anism would be met with massive popular resistance is one that cannot now
be answered with assurance.
2. Precommitment Through Central Bank Reform
Because, in the Argentine case, a central problem of precommitment is
how to devise a system in which the government does not give way to
short-term pressures to monetize budget deficits or provide economic favors
to political friends, an obvious approach is to place the central bank in a
position where it is not likely to engage in such behavior. The central
bank, in the words of Jon Elster, "can be seen as the repository of reason
against the short-term claim of passion.""
The need for central bank reform was particularly compelling in the case
of Argentina because the executive power has frequently enlisted the central
bank as an agent in the executive's political agenda. Per6n nationalized
deposits in private banks in 1946 and again in 19 73 ."o Even when
deposits were not nationalized, the central bank was enlisted to serve state
interests. It accepted discounts from banks of paper, much of it of
questionable quality, issued by government enterprises in exchange for
loans. Thus, the central bank indirectly financed government operations
outside of the explicit budget.10' It also gave rediscounts to the national
98. Communication from Roberto Gargarella (Apr. 25, 1993) (on file with the author).
99. ELSTER, supra note 19, at 89.
100. See THOMAS J.T. BALO, THE ARGENTINE BANKING CRISIS OF 1980 36 (International
Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/87177) (on file with the author).
101. See WORLD BANK, supra note 26, at 55-57.
1993] 1081
Washington University Open Scholarship
1082 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
mortgage bank (Banco Hipotecario Nacional or BHC) and the national
development bank (Banco National de Desarrollo or BANADE), both of
which existed principally for the purpose of dispensing government
subsidies to favored industries or individuals. 2 The central bank also
assisted failing or insolvent private banks through the rediscount pro-
cess. 3 The costs of this "quasi-fiscal deficit" have been enormous.'
4
The central bank reform legislation of 1992 represents an attempt to
effect a precommitment not to engage in such expenditures in the future
and not to monetize the deficit by issuing new money.'0 5 There are two
important aspects to this legislation. First, the governors of the central
bank are given fixed, six-year terms with protections against removal
during their term except for cause. This provision is clearly intended to
insulate the central bank from short-term political pressures---either from
the Executive, the Congress, or political parties. Arguably, it will give the
central bank some power to resist the will of the President when monetary
policy is at stake.
This law represents a significant reform to the earlier regime, under
which the minister of the economy had the power to instruct the head of
the central bank." 6 While it is not clear whether a central bank president
will actually be able to resist political pressures to inflate the currency in
the future, the protections against removal from office and the de facto
independence that these protections grant should provide some assurance.
In addition to increasing central bank autonomy by insulating its board
members from political control, the new law decreases central bank
autonomy by limiting its discretion to take actions which inflate the
currency, such as funding fiscal deficits or advancing liquidity assistance
to shaky banks except on short terms and backed by good collateral. 7
These two provisions-the political independence of the central bank and
the limitations on its discretion--overlap in the sense that if political actors
exert pressure against the head of the central bank to monetize the deficit
or to provide special financial assistance to favored groups, the central bank
president can argue that he or she is prevented by law from complying with
102. WORLD BANK, supra note 26, at 57.
103. Id.
104. Letter from Dr. Augusto C. Magliano to Geoffrey P. Miller (Apr. 13, 1993) (on file with
author).
105. For a description of the legislation, see supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
106. Interview with Dr. Jos6 Luis Machinea (Dec. 1992).
107. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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such requests. Again, this form of precommitment would be more effective
if the Argentine Judiciary possessed greater powers to block illegal
government action. Increased judicial power would tend to lend credibility
to the central bank's claim that its hands are tied in a given case.
Nevertheless, the presence of binding legal constraints provides an
additional level of protection against inflationary policies by the central
bank in the service of short-term political objectives.
3. Precommitment Through Market Discipline
Perhaps the most unusual device for precommitment found in the
Argentine constitutional moment of 1989-91 is the mechanism of deliberate
precommitment through market discipline.08 The underlying philosophy
of this device appears to be that government can be made more reliable and
more efficient if it, like institutions in the private sector, is subjected to the
discipline of the private marketplace. In the case of the central bank, the
government deliberately rendered the bank subject to runs by private parties
in the event the government failed to fulfill its promise to provide a stable
currency.
The specific mechanism for accomplishing this market discipline was the
convertibility program under which the government promises to maintain
a fixed, one-to-one exchange ratio between the U.S. dollar and the
Argentine peso. This program can be seen as an extraordinary gamble in
which the government backs its commitment to maintain monetary
discipline by deliberately rendering itself vulnerable to a golpe de mercado.
To run the peso, it was no longer necessary to go into foreign exchange
markets. Anyone could convert pesos to dollars through the banking
system.
Moreover, the government's commitment to maintain the value of the
peso is embodied in a law that requires the central bank to fulfill its
commitment even if doing so exhausts its foreign reserves. The central
bank is required to maintain enough foreign reserves to ensure that it can
fulfill its commitment even if the entire monetary base of domestic
currency were converted into dollars. These provisions effectively prevent
the government from engaging in deficit financing to any significant extent
even if it wanted to do so.'" By deliberately exposing itself to rigorous
108. See generally, ABRA Interview (Dec. 1992).
109. These provisions also supported the government's promise not to bail out depositors in failed
or failing banks. See Miller, supra note 12.
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market discipline, the government assured the world financial market that
it would carry forward its promises to stabilize the currency.
The convertibility law appears to have successfully assured markets that
the government would exercise restraint in its conduct of monetary
policy.110  Investment has flooded into the country and inflation has
remained very low by historical Argentine standards. As a precommitment
device, the law appears to have been brilliantly conceived.
The convertibility plan, however, is not a panacea for Argentina's
economic problems. By tagging the peso at a fixed, one-to-one exchange
rate with the dollar, the convertibility plan has stabilized the currency, but
at the cost of overvaluing the peso relative to the dollar.' Argentina
went from a trade surplus in 1991 to a $2.5 billion trade deficit in
1992."' Over time, the overvaluation of the peso may lead to political
unrest as workers, managers, and owners of export industries find it
difficult to survive economically.
Further, persistent overvaluation may lead to a continued flight away
from pesos toward dollars which can only be counteracted by high nominal
interest rates on peso deposits. As previously noted, the rates on peso
deposits over the past few years have been higher than the rates on dollar-
denominated deposits even though pesos and dollars are now convertible
on a one-to-one basis."1 The higher peso rates suggest that the market
is demanding a premium for keeping funds in pesos. This, in turn, reflects
the perceived risk that the government will devalue the peso by altering the
convertibility ratio or even abandoning convertibility altogether. If the
holders of peso deposits lose confidence in the government's commitment
to maintain convertibility, a run to dollars is not out of the question.114
110. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
I 11. See Hannon, supra note 70.
112. See Currency Hotline: Argentine Peso, BUSINESS INT'L MONEY REPORT, Mar. 1, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLO file.
113. See Hannon, supra note 70.
114. The danger is illustrated by current central bank President Roque Femindez's analysis of the
problems under the earlier regime of 1989-90, when the government pledged to peg australs to dollars
at a fixed rate and interest rates on australs were extremely high by world standards. Femrnndez writes:
Even the most naive of depositors knew that the situation could not last long, and at a given
point of time would consider it reasonable to convert Austral deposits to US dollars. In a few
months a few smart depositors could realize in Argentina a gain that would take almost a
decade to obtain in the world financial market. Of course, not all could realize such a gain.
It was the attempt of many to capitalize such a gain [that] promoted a run on the financial
system leading to hyperinflation. I believe that this is the most simple and more powerful
explanation of the hyperinflations of 1989 ....
Roque B. Femndez, Exchange Rate Policy and Hyperinflation, Junio 1990 (unpublished manuscript
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The potential weaknesses in the convertibility program were illustrated
in November 1992 when unfounded rumors about Cavallo's possible
resignation sparked a flight to dollars.115  The government stemmed the
panic by selling foreign reserves, thus increasing the supply of dollars
relative to pesos and restoring approximate parity between the currencies.
However, the events reinforced public concerns about the fragility of the
reforms.
Financial markets are aware of the risks in the convertibility law." 6
Thus, beneficial as the reforms have been to date, there is no guarantee that
conditions will not deteriorate in the event that markets lose confidence in
the government's commitment to convertibility. Although leading
government officials lose no opportunity to reassure the public that
devaluation will not occur, 7 Argentine governments have broken
promises of this sort in the past and the people cannot yet rest assured that
the current stability will last for a sustained period.
IV. CONCLUSION
Argentina is a land of extraordinary contrasts: Spanish-speaking, yet
with a majority population of Italian descent; a New World country that
identifies more with Europe than with the Americas; land of rugged
individualism, yet a tradition of state terror; nationalistic to a fault, yet
fundamentally insecure about its place on the world scene. Thus, it is
ironic, but perhaps not surprising, that one of the most radical economic
transformations of recent times should have been engineered by the very
party which had instituted most of the failed policies that are now being
swept away.
While Argentina's constitutional moment of 1989-91 is unprecedented
in many ways, it nevertheless represents as much a part of the Argentine
tradition as the excesses, corruption, and statist policies that it replaced.
Almost exactly a century earlier, in 1890, Argentina, crippled by unbridled
public spending, patronage, and deficit financing, defaulted on its massive
on file with the author).
115. Run on Peso Forces New Reforms in Argentina, Bus. LATIN AM., Nov. 23, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLO file.
116. See, e.g., Interview with Ricardo Angl6s (Dec. 21, 1992).
117. See, e.g., A Market Economy is the Best Option, Interview with Finance Minister Domingo
Cavallo, FUNDAC16N MEDrrERRANEA NEWSLETTER (Banco de la Nacion Argentina), April 1993, at 6
("[t]he peso-dollar exchange rate has been on a par for two years and I take this opportunity to refute
yet again all rumors of devaluation.)
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foreign debt and fell into economic chaos." 8 The banking system
collapsed and many banks failed. The government was forced to lay off
workers and slash spending on public projects. Charged with responsibility
to rectify the situation, Carlos Pellegrini cut back government spending,
renegotiated the country's foreign debt, and reorganized its banking system.
The Banco de la Naci6n Argentina, created by these reforms, was explicitly
denied the power to lend money to the state or to issue money beyond the
value of its gold reserves." 9
A century later, Carlos Menem, Domingo Cavallo and Roque Femnndez
would replicate many of these reforms-renegotiating the foreign debt,
downsizing the government, prohibiting the central bank from issuing
money beyond its reserves, and barring the central bank from lending
money to the state. Pellegrini's reforms sparked an era of prosperity and
stability in Argentina that lasted more than a generation. 2 Those who
care about the future of Argentina-whatever their political affiliation-can
only hope that the reforms of Menem, Cavallo and Femndez enjoy at least
equal success.
118. See LEWIS, supra note 3, at 28.
119. See id.
120. See id.
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